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The last time North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un traveled abroad in his favorite armored green and yellow train was a 60-hour journey in 2019 to Vietnam to meet with then-US President Donald Trump.
However, the long trip was not a success. Talks collapsed, and months later Pyongyang abused Trump in obscure English, calling the US leader an “old fool”. The leader is due to travel again in the coming days, this time to Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East, where he will meet with President Vladimir Putin. The topic being discussed? Selling ammunition to Moscow for the Ukrainian war. Kim Jong-un is expected to ride again on his train – which is believed to contain more than 20 armored vehicles and a special compartment for the general secretary (his name), with a bright white interior. But this time, it’s almost certain to succeed.
For the dictator, believed to be 39, partly Swiss-educated and with a professed love for American basketball, the assignment is typically staunch realpolitik. The early days of Kim Jong-un’s rule were marked by brutal repression, with his half-brother Kim Jong-nam killed by a nerve agent and his uncle Jang Song-thaek executed by firing squad for treason. He has also moved to weaken the power of top generals, who have treated him as an unknown after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il.
King has made his mark and is now pursuing Bingjin Ideology – Dogma that promotes both economic and nuclear weapons development. Its purpose is to develop a nuclear arsenal, alter the balance of power in North Asia, and possibly threaten the United States. Against this backdrop, Pyongyang’s growing alliance with Moscow has increased the risk of instability in one of the world’s most dangerous regions. “The Russia-North Korea axis complicates security in Ukraine and the Korean peninsula,” write Victor Cha and Ellen Kim of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank. .”
It was unclear what the agreement between North Korea and Russia would contain. Pyongyang could provide ammunition, multiple rocket launchers and short-range ballistic missiles — all of which would help Moscow repel Kiev’s counteroffensive. In return, Moscow may provide food, oil and military technology, as well as hard currency as payment. Russia could also be persuaded to supply North Korea with highly sensitive military technology that would threaten its neighbors, particularly South Korea and Japan. Cha and Kim added: “Russian-North Korean cooperation could go beyond conventional arms deals and food/energy aid and could extend to advanced technologies for satellites, nuclear-powered submarines, and ballistic missiles.”
Anxiety is running high in Seoul, which ended its war with North Korea, then led by Kim Jong Il’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, in 1953 with an armistice but no formal peace treaty. “It’s fair to say that the second Cold War has begun,” said Kim Jae-chun, a professor at Sogang University in Seoul. “North Korea, China, and Russia have become the new axis of evil, all countries ruled by dictators that threaten the democratic international order.”
Locking down the country to fend off the Covid-19 pandemic has become second nature due to Kim Jong Un’s penchant for isolationism. But air travel has only recently resumed after a marathon three-and-a-half-year blockade, and most of North Korea’s 26 million people are not believed to have been vaccinated. The economic damage from the blockade is understood to be far-reaching, exacerbating Kim’s need to sell arms to Russia.
Kim and Putin are expected to meet on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, which also marks a broader military pact. In July, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang and toured an arms exhibition featuring combat and surveillance drones as well as the regime’s latest intercontinental ballistic missiles. Pyongyang explicitly supported Moscow’s war in Ukraine, vetoed UN resolutions condemning the invasion, recognized Russia’s occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk, and even shipped arms to Wagner’s mercenary group fighting for the Kremlin in Ukraine.
But despite Kim’s explicit overtures to Russia and Moscow’s mutual interest, China’s view of the two neighbors’ growing affinity remains up in the air. While China maintains close diplomatic ties with both North Korea and Russia, its diplomats have privately expressed reservations about the two countries’ course of action. They also noted that one of Beijing’s top priorities is to restore relations with European powers and prevent further deterioration with the United States. “Unlike Russia, China does not want to see relations with the U.S. deteriorate, so it is reluctant to expand military cooperation with North Korea,” said Chung Sang-chang of the Sejong Institute in South Korea.
Kim Jong Un is used to the quicksand of diplomatic loyalty. In the long run-up to the 2019 summit, Trump first tweeted in 2017 that he dubbed him “Little Rocket Man” — a nickname Kim Jong Un disliked. By 2018, however, Trump had reversed course, calling Kim Jong-un a “valuable negotiator.” Kim Jong-un has little illusion that the Kremlin’s recent cozy embrace of his “hermit kingdom” is more than a deal: it’s about getting respectable weapons in a dangerous region.
james.kynge@ft.com, junga.song@ft.com
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